A Comparative Cost Disadvantage Driven By Foreign Competition by Nwaokoro, Amaechi Nkemakolem
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
1 
A Comparative Cost Disadvantage  
Driven By Foreign Competition 
Amaechi Nkemakolem Nwaokoro, Ph.D., Albany State University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study focuses on the impact of foreign physical steel imports on the output of the US steel 
industry.  This industry faces a comparative disadvantage in costs and from reduced utilized capacity 
in steel making. The strong desire of many foreign steel producers to export steel to the US lucrative 
market led to their plant modernization with the associated economies of scale.  This led to steel 
import surge in America.  The imposed trade restrictions had mixed outcomes.  The domestic steel 
output is modeled as function of steel imports and from the size of the economy addressed by 
shipments.  The OLS estimate of steel imports is insignificant and this could be explained by the 
ineffectiveness of the various instituted trade instruments, from increased foreign prices of steel, 
and from depreciated dollars at some points in time during the period in study.  As expected the 
measure of the economy—shipments variable has a positive impact on steel production. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
he goal of every nation is to have a favorable balance of trade.  Therefore countries engage both 
innovativeness and trade policies as factors to achieve or enhance their favorable balance of trade—
increase exports over the respective imports.  This encourages retaliatory policies among nations 
involved in trade.  In most cases contemporary politics form the basis of the restrictive trade policies.  It was a boom 
for the U.S. Steel industry in the periods of 1940s and 1950s.  As from the 1960s through 1980s the industry 
witnessed unfavorable market conditions and structural problems.  The structural problem started in 1950s as a result 
of capital expansion and without capital consolidation.  A lot of utilize capacities as a result, developed. 
 
With a substantial physical efficiency and productivity, the industry fulfilled a substantial part of the 
international steel demand in 1940s and 1950s.  The industry therefore was able to record a renounced benefit of 
economies of scale in the world
1
.  Growing import problem faced by the industry was visible in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s.  A striking period for the increasing steel imports in America was during the 1959 four-month strike.  As steel 
consumers scramble to increase their levels of steel inventories, steel crisis developed and led to increase in demand 
for steel.  Steel import problem has led to a strong variation in the domestic steel output in the very critical period of 
1963 to 1988. 
 
U.S. lucrative steel market motivated many nations especially the developing nations to export to the 
market. A big portion of the blame for the increasing imports was placed on Eisenhower Administration for up-
grading the foreign steel plants where exports were increasingly sent to the United States.  To the developing 
countries, development of steel industry was a means of generating industrial exports for engaging this market.  
Therefore many developing nations focused on the development of this technically and heavily integrated sector that 
could foster their macroeconomic development.  So focusing on a heavy industry such as steel that was commanding 
foreign reserves was deemed a profitable venture associated with national wealth and prestige.  
 
An incentive to send steel into this market increased during the periods of dollar appreciation.  As dollar 
appreciated, U.S. exports became more expensive, imports became less expensive and countries exporting to 
T 
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American market were able to maximize their earnings.  This study therefore wants to explore the sources and the 
magnitude of the steel import assault on the US steel output.  With availability of data, steel imports variable will not 
be identified by a proxy. 
 
To show the impact of steel imports on the domestic steel production, the domestic steel production is 
generally and empirically modeled as function of steel imports.  Another factor, other shipment (total shipments 
minus steel shipments) is introduced in the model to measure the impact of the economy on domestic steel 
production during the wave of increasing steel imports.  The estimate of steel imports is insignificant and this is 
explained by the net impact of the various instituted trade instruments, from increased foreign prices of steel, and 
from depreciated dollars at some points in time during the period in study.  As expected the measure of the 
economy—other shipments variable has a positive impact on steel production. 
 
The following is the remainder of the study.  In section II the study revisits with the critical issues about 
steel imports and exports.  Section III surveys the sources of US steel imports.  Section IV centers discussion on the 
panic attitudes of steel consumers.  Respectively, sections V and VI center on data, research methodology and 
empirical results, and conclusion.  I will relate this research to Aw and Roberts (1985), MacPhee (1974), United 
States International Trade Commission (1988). 
 
II.  CRITICAL ISSUES ABOUT STEEL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
 
The US steel industry witnessed a substantial physical efficiency and productivity in 1940s and 1950s, and 
fulfilled a substantial part the international steel demand.  Generally, increasing imports is a problem in America.  
The most damaged domestic industry by imports has been the U.S. steel industry.  It has been very much 
marginalized to the extent that one could say that the U.S. market could eventually depend entirely on foreign steel.  
Steel import crisis dominated the entire 1970s. 
 
To enhance efficiency, Japanese adopted continuous casting technology in steel making in the 1980s.  And 
as more of the foreign competitors adopted the newest technology in the period, the U.S. steel industry was 
challenged to adopt similar technologies in the midst of its vast and expanded capital base from the 1950s.  The 
industry therefore became highly overcapitalized (Hogan, 1983, pp. 6-7, 77, 80, 108-109, Barnett & Schorsch 1983, 
pp. 13, 27).  The technical changes have had a devastating impact on the U.S. steel industry as the change in 
technology led to a substantial cost reduction in Japan and in some other countries but not in the US (1989, US 
International Trade Commission).  The low production cost advantage from economies of scale of the foreign 
producers led to dumping of steel in American market.  The result of all the changes in technology has led to a 
decline in the output of U.S. steel industry. 
 
Before 1985 VRAs, appreciated U.S. dollars, increased costs for both raw materials and labor were claimed 
to be responsible for an unfavorable differential cost of production especially between US and Japanese steel 
producers (1989, US International Trade Commission).  Also, fixed cost of production increased for the U.S. steel 
producers as the utilized capacity substantially decreased.  These compelled integrated plants to consolidate some 
facilities and to retire out- of -date facilities and plants there were costly to operate.  The needed raw materials were 
purchased from the “spot market” to avoid commitments in long term contracts and for factors prices to be sensitive 
to the market prices.  Energy prices were equally handled favorably in contracts.  The mini-mills also confronted the 
situation by lowering factor prices and enhancing productivity.  The differential cost disadvantage was mostly 
checked by improvement in cost reduction from the integrated steel plants, from the efficiency of mini-mills, and 
from favorable change in exchange rate.  As verified in the table 1 below, even with the technical and contractual 
adjustments, foreign steel producers still enjoyed a strong comparative advantage over the US steel plants. 
 
The high cost of labor reflected a high union wage rate paid in the US steel industry (Nwaokoro, 2004). 
Labor contracts seemed to favor US steel workers.  As the union created classical unemployment, productivity 
increased and this would therefore increase the wage rate.  The cost differential percentage narrowed down from 159 
in 1982 to 10 in 1988.  Employer insistence on cost reduction or employees’ concessions or increasing use of 
technology might have led to narrowing down the cost percentage gap.  The gap might have narrowed as factors 
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prices became sensitive to the market prices.  Japanese steel labor seemed to be having favorable contracts evidenced 
by the fact that cost of labor has been increasing after it fell in 1984. 
 
Japanese steel producers have a competitive edge over the US with the cost of materials.  Favorable long 
term contracts could explain this since Japan imports most of the raw materials.  As with the cost of labor, materials 
cost differential percent dropped from 40 in 1982 to 5 in 1988.  The winding down of this percentage could be 
explained by raw materials being purchased from the “spot market” to avoid commitments in long term contracts. 
 
US steel industry has favorable access to finances for funding given the close proximity to innovative US 
Capital Market that is capable of attracting funds from all over the world.  This advantage increased from 1982 to 
1988 as evidenced by the decreasing and increasing cost of financing of US and Japanese steel producers 
respectively.  This advantage was very important for planning short- and long- term financing. This advantage might 
have been reinforced in later years as factors prices became sensitive to the market prices.  In summary, each of these 
countries commanded a favorable cost advantage in one half of the selected years.  As from 1982-1984, Japanese 
steel producers maintained a favorable cost advantage.  From 1986 to 1988, American steel producers commanded a 
favorable cost advantage.  The 1985 VRAs and contract adjustments led to this advantage.  
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Production Costs1 for Steelmakers 
Selected Years 1982-1988 
Item Japan United States Cost Differential2 
Labor U.S. Dollars U.S. Dollars Percent 
1982 $101 $262 159 
1984 92 181 97 
1986 132 167 27 
1988 145 160 10 
Materials    
1982 253 355 40 
1984 229 315 38 
1986 260 288 11 
1988 277 291 5 
Financial    
1982 98 68 (30) 
1984 97 60 (38) 
1986 128 51 (60) 
1988 105 43 (59) 
Total    
1982 452 685 52 
1984 417 557 34 
1986 520 506 (3) 
1988 552 484 (12) 
1Per metric ton of finished steel. 
2Estimated U.S. production costs as a percent of Japanese costs. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission March 1989. 
 
 
 Steel import problem has led to the institution of various trade agreements including Voluntary Restrictions 
Agreements (VRAs) between U.S. and some other countries.  In effect there are twenty VRAs that were negotiated 
with European community, and with 19 other countries during the period studied (US International Trade 
Commission, 1989).  With 1985 VRAs, quotas were enforced until 1986 and it became a lax in 1987.  Strong dollars 
or increase in demand might have led to this lax market condition. 
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Table 2: Steel: Countries Subject to VRAs, and the Overall Import Share, 1988 
   Overall import share of U.S. apparent consumption
1 
  Quantity  
  Short tons Percent
3 
Market Share Agreements   
Australia (2) 0.24 
Austria (2) 0.23 
Brazil (2) 1.42 
EC (2) 5.36 
Finland (2) 0.23 
Japan  (2) 5.93 
Mexico (2) 0.42 
South Africa3 (2) 0 
South Korea (2) 1.82 
Spain (2) 0.69 
    
Quota Agreements:   
Quota level for 1988:4   
Czechoslovakia 40,100 0.04 
East Germany 228,500 0.23 
Hungary 33,300 0.03 
Poland 87,200 0.87 
People's Republic of China 77,400 0.08 
Portugal 29,300 0.03 
Romania 111,400 0.11 
Trinidad and Tobago 43,500 0.04 
Venezuela  143,900 50.14 
Yugoslavia 20,900 0.02 
    
Semifinished Steel Agreements:  
Quota level for 1988   
Australia 50,000 (2) 
Brazil 700,000 (2) 
EC 6840,000 (2) 
Finland 15,000 (2) 
Japan  100,000 (2) 
Mexico 100,000 (2) 
South Africa3 0 (2) 
South Korea 50,000 (2) 
Spain 50,000 (2) 
Venezuela 71,225 (2) 
1Including semifinished steel for all countries.  Does not include adjustments  for overages in 1987 
2Not applicable 
3Steel imports fro South Africa are reduced by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which embargoes certain steel 
products. 
4Estimated share of apparent U.S. consumption, including semifinished steel, except as noted.  Does not include adjustments 
for overages in 1987.  Estimates based on Feb. 26, 188.  DRI forecast 
5Excluding semifinished steel. 
6Includes approximately 200000 tons, which may be imported at the discretion of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission March 1989 
 
 
III.  SOURCES OF US STEEL IMPORTS 
 
The table 2 verifies that a lot of countries are interested in exporting steel to the US lucrative steel market.  
Japanese and EC control disproportional shares of this market.  South Korea and Brazil are next in the control of the 
market.  Following these, in the control of this market is Spain and is respectively followed by Mexico, Australia, 
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Austria, and Finland. The respective shares of these nations are comparable.  The need to maintain strong market 
shares has led to these countries observing comparable shares.  Foreign governments had history of providing 
subsidies to their steel industries and had led to the import surge in America market. 
 
The US has many steel quota agreements with many nations including eastern European countries, 
developing nations, and China.  These countries, especially those that are based on centrally planned economies, and 
developing nations needed steel exports promotions to enhance economic development.  No one country controls up 
to one percent share of the market based on quota agreements.  This implies that many nations scrambled the viable 
US steel market to have some level of quota.  Poland enjoyed the highest percent share of the market based on these 
agreements.   
 
Based on semi-finished steel agreements, EC sent the highest quota to the US market.  This is closely 
followed by Brazil, Japan, and Mexico.  The respective quotas of other countries in these agreements are 
comparable.  This implied that nations with these contracts negotiated very hard to have comparable shares of US 
semi-finished steel import market. 
 
IV.  THE PANIC ATTITUDES OF STEEL CONSUMERS 
 
The US steel consumers are driven by steel market shocks or panics.  Fearing the possibility of running out 
of steel inventory, the US steel consumers have a history of stockpiling inventory.  For example, stockpiling 
inventory and economic activity led to an increase in the apparent steel consumption in the period of 1983-1988.  
Inventory increased by 24 percent and this reflected a significant demand in 1987-1988 (US International Trade 
Commission, 1989).  The steel import crisis in America started as a result of the 1959 strike that lasted for four 
months.  A panic attitude of the consumers to stockpile steel products during this long strike caused steel consumers 
to demand more imports. 
 
The crisis situation caused the U.S. to become a net importer of steel for the first time.  The dollar was weak 
in the period of 1985-1987.  Therefore domestic steel output increased.   In 1959, U.S. steel exports and imports 
were 1.5 and 4.5 million tons, respectively (Hogan 1991, p. 144).  As foreign steel became cheaper than domestic 
steel, steel consumers’ attitudes were directed to demanding imported steel which grew significantly in the 1960s.  
The threats of strikes in 1965 and 1968 reinforced the consumers' desire for imports which grew rapidly from 4 
million tons in 1963 to 10.3 million tons in 1965 (Hogan 1991, p. 144). 
 
An increase in the 1970 price levels of European and Japanese steel made the U.S. steel consumers to 
purchase more from local producers.  This led to the leveling off of steel imports (Hudson & Sadler 1989).  Because 
the 1971 price fell in the EEC and in Japan but not in the U.S., an increase in the level of steel imports was 
experienced in the U.S. market.  The increased imports led to a revision of the existing VRAs.  Eventually, VRAs 
were initiated for 1972-1974, but all restrictions ended in 1973.  These VRAs set the yearly U.S. steel ceilings at 7.3 
and 5.9 million tons, respectively, for the steel exports from the EEC and Japan.  Though a provision was made in 
these VRAs regarding the U.S. imports of some specialty steels like stainless, alloy, and other high grade steel 
products, it was not enforced. 
 
The market was lucrative in 1973 as a result of the dollar's devaluation in 1971 and again in 1973.  There 
was a shortage of steel.  Steel import prices rose, and demand was strong in Japan and in the EEC.  As the boom 
continued in 1974, the U.S. government did not enforce the 1969-1972 VRAs.  In 1975, there was an acute drop in 
U.S. steel production.  An incentive to advance employment in Japan and in Europe in most of the 1970s caused a 
jump in their steel export levels into the United States.  Between 1976 and 1977, U.S. steel imports increased from 
14.3 million tons to 19.3 million tons.  Imports were priced below the domestic producers' prices and the foreign 
producers' production cost.  Government ownership of steel industries and government provision of heavy subsidies 
to steel production in some foreign countries were partially blamed for the increased competition of steel imports 
(Hogan 1991). 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
6 
An appreciating dollar caused import expansion in the presence of the low growth of the U.S. steel market 
in 1981, and by January, 1982, U.S. producers asked for countervailing duties on imports, mostly from Europe 
(Barnett & Schorsch 1983, pp. 241-242).  This action was initiated to stop foreign exporters from dumping steel in 
American market and this eventually led to the complete removal of policy regime (1978-1982) of Trigger Price 
Mechanism (TPM) that set steel competitive price based on Japan's steel production costs and provided 8% profit 
(Barnett & Schorsch 1983, pp. 239-240, Barnett & Schorsch 1983, pp. 241-242).. 
 
V.  DATA, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 This study employed data of annual variables for steel mill production (SIC 3312) and steel imports, and are 
measured in net tons
2
.  Respectively, the means and the associated standard deviations of the series are 117,703,310 
and 18,205,227 for output, 0.13 and 0.04 for steel import shares, and 19,531.24 and 2,221.11 for other shipments 
variable.  Figure 1indicates that steel imports' share in the domestic steel market, shows a general upward trend 
through 1985, though considerable volatility is present. 
 
Figure 1: Steel Import Shares
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This variable declines markedly in the periods of 1971-1973 and 1985-1987.  The decline of this variable in 
1971-1973 is explained by the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and 1973 and by the strong steel demand in Japan 
and the EEC during this period (Hudson & Sadler, 1989; p. 49, Hogan 1991, p. 45).  For the 1985-1987 periods, the 
decline in imports was a result of the 1985 VRAs (Hogan 1991, pp. 145-146).  During the period studied, the 
average annual growth of steel imports between 1963 and 1975 was 9.97% and between 1976 and 1988, this growth 
was 6.29%.  These rapid growth rates motivated the imposition of the trade restrictions. 
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Less steel output fluctuation occurred in the 1960s.  Domestic steel output was over 141 million tons in 
1969 and was roughly 110 million tons in 1963.  1970s witnessed substantial output variations and 1980s recorded 
the lowest levels of steel output.  By 1982 the lowest yearly steel production was below 80 million tons and this 
contrasts the 1981output demand level that was over 120 million tons.  The steel output demand started to rose 
gradually in 1986 after observing fewer variations in the years following 1982.  In the period of 1974 and 1985, the 
output of both the integrated producers and the specialty steel firms declined significantly from 102 million tons to 
58 million tons (Crandall 1986, pp. 13-14).  With innovational and flexible techniques, the output of mini-mills rose 
from about 8 million tons to 15 million tons in this same period.  This highlights both integrated producers and the 
specialty steel firms as the firms in the industry that are affected by the steel imports surge in America.  The average 
annual growth rate in steel production between 1963 and 1975 was 1.05%.  This growth rate dropped to -0.04% 
between 1976 and 1988. 
 
The other shipments variable is constructed by removing the annual steel shipments from the total U.S. 
manufacturing shipments.  This variable is measured in millions of dollars and is a proxy for steel demand.  This 
factor measures the impact of the economy on steel output, and is deflated with the industrial price index
3
. 
 
Research Methodology:  Generally, the domestic cost minimizing steel output (Q) is modeled as function of steel 
imports (M) and of other shipments variable (Os) as:   
 
Q= ( M, Os). (1) 
 
Given equation 1, the output empirical equation is stated as: 
 
Log Qt = α + α1logMt + α2logOst +µt                    (2) 
 
where αi, i = 0, .., 2., and ut is the error term. 
 
 To reduce the serial correlation problem that is prevalent in a time series data, equation 2 is redefined in a 
difference model where any change of the variables is defined by
dt
dlogX
 = X .  The results from equation 2 are posted 
in table 3. 
 
 Though columns 1-3 have the expected negative sign on the estimates of steel imports estimates, the 
estimates are insignificant and are statistically consistent. Serial correlation in the data is controlled in the presence 
of the lag of steel output and in a difference model.  In the difference model, the estimate of the other shipment 
variable is significant indicating that the stochastic economy had a net positive impact on the steel output.  As usually 
the case the effect of the lag of the output dominates in model.  This basically implies that the current output 
reflected the previous output.  The insignificance of the estimate of the steel imports could be explained by the net-
positive effects of the various instituted VRAs and other trade agreements, from increased foreign prices of steel, and 
from devalued dollars at some points in time during the period in study.   
 
 Fearing the possibility of running out of steel inventory, the US steel consumers have a history of 
stockpiling inventory.  For example, stockpiling inventory and economic activity led to an increase in the apparent 
steel consumption in the period of 1983-1988.  Inventory increased by 24 percent and this reflected a significant 
demand in 1987-1988 (US International Trade Commission, 1989).  The steel import crisis in America started as a 
result of the 1959 strike that lasted for four months.  A panic attitude of the consumers to stockpile steel products 
during this long strike caused steel consumers to demand more imports. 
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Table 3: Steel Output Elasticity Estimates from OLS Models 
 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
OLS Basic Mode 
with M 
OLS Basic Mode 
with M, Os 
OLS Basic Model 
with Lagged Q 
OLS Diff Model 
Constant Term 18.95* 
(1.73) 
20.43* 
(2.81) 
5.66 
(4.25) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
M -0.17 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.11 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Os  -0.38 
(0.57) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
1.81* 
(0.50) 
Lag Q   0.72* 
(0.16) 
 
 R
—2 0.07 0.04 0.53 0.40 
 DW 0.68 0.68 2.21 2.68 
 Rho 0.63 0.63 -0.02 -0.37 
Sample size 26 26 25 25 
*Denotes estimates that are statistically significant at the marginal probability (P = 0.05) level. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 U.S. steel output is being displaced by steel imports since 1960s.  This contrasts the period of 1940s and 
1950s when it was a boom for the industry.  Costs rose in the industry due to overcapitalization and high cost of 
labor inputs.  Along with these was comparative costs advantage from foreign competitors.  The output of the 
industry therefore declined as the surge of foreign steel increased. The American steel consumers contributed to the 
imports surge by stockpiling in responding to domestic shocks, changes in foreign steel prices, and variation of the 
dollar.  Eroding steel output was checked by instituting multiple VRAs and other trade agreements.  Also, the 
industry initiated costs reduction measures by purchasing inputs from spot markets and by having contracts 
adjustments. 
 
 The overall impacts of the trade instruments did seem to have protected the industry after a substantial 
damage of steel output downward variation.  The initiated costs reduction measures and contracts adjustments have 
had impact in boosting the competitiveness of the industry.  Empirical results suggest that steel imports variable is 
not significant to explain domestic steel output.  This implies that the imposed trade restrictions did have some 
appreciable impacts in restricting foreign steel.  The economy had a net positive effect on steel output during the 
period studied.  The vision of the U.S. steel industry would therefore focus on a continuous implementation of the 
initiated costs reduction measures and contracts adjustments.  Capital restructuring has to target the reduction of 
excess capacities.  These could enhance the competitiveness of the industry.   
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Endnotes 
  
1
 See Hogan (1991) and Barnett & Schorsch (1983) for discussions of these issues. 
2
 The source of this variable is Metal Statistics 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984 and 1990 series. 
3
 Information on both the total shipments and on the steel shipments comes from the 1958-1977, 1977-1982, 1982-
1900 Current Industrial Report series, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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